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Global Fossil Energy Markets and 
Climate Change Mitigation – an 
analysis with REMIND 
 
Nico Bauer1, Ioanna Mouratiadou, Gunnar Luderer, Lavinia Baumstark, Robert J. Brecha, 
Ottmar Edenhofer, Elmar Kriegler 
Abstract 
We analyze the dynamics of global fossil resource markets under different assumptions for 
the supply of fossil fuel resources, development pathways for energy demand, and climate policy 
settings. Resource markets, in particular the oil market, are characterized by a large discrepancy 
between costs of resource extraction and commodity prices on international markets. We explain 
this observation in terms of (a) the intertemporal scarcity rent, (b) regional price differentials 
arising from trade and transport costs, (c) heterogeneity and inertia in the extraction sector. These 
effects are captured by the REMIND model. We use the model to explore economic effects of 
changes in coal, oil and gas markets induced by climate-change mitigation policies.  
 A large share of fossil fuel reserves and resources will be used in the absence of climate 
policy leading to atmospheric GHG concentrations well beyond a level of 550ppm CO2-eq. This 
result holds independently of different assumptions about energy demand and fossil fuel 
availability. Achieving ambitious climate targets will drastically reduce fossil fuel consumption, 
in particular the consumption of coal. Conventional oil and gas as well as non-conventional oil 
reserves are still exhausted. We find the net present value of fossil fuel rent until 2100 at 
30tril.US$ with a large share of oil and a small share of coal. This is reduced by 9 and 12tril.US$ 
to achieve climate stabilization at 550 and 450ppm CO2-eq, respectively. This loss is, however, 
overcompensated by revenues from carbon pricing that are 21 and 32tril.US$, respectively. The 
overcompensation also holds under variations of energy demand and fossil fuel supply.  
Keywords: Climate change mitigation, fossil resource rent, price formation mechanism 
JEL: D72, Q40, Q54 
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1. Introduction 
The interaction of climate policy and fossil fuel markets is of great interest for climate and 
energy economists and for policy makers. Climate change stabilization imposes limitations on 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, thus leading to a re-allocation of the use and prices 
of fossil fuels. A comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic and energy sector con-
sequences of policy action requires a thorough quantification of energy market effects. Global 
mitigation costs and distributional effects largely depend on baseline assumptions of energy 
demand (GDP, population, technological change) and fossil fuel supply that are highly uncertain 
(Weyant 2001).  
Climate change mitigation costs are constituted to a large part by the opportunity costs of not 
using fossil energy, but substituting them with alternative energy supplies, increased energy 
efficiency or reduced economic activity. Evaluation of climate change stabilization costs must 
also consider fossil fuel market re-allocation, i.e. the endogenous changes to fossil fuel prices 
and usage induced by climate policies (Harberger 1968; Grubb 2001).  
The IPCC analyzed sectoral effects of emissions mitigation (Barker et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 
2007), mainly focusing on short- to medium-term mitigation policies. The assessment was based 
on fossil energy prices that were – in accordance with observations of that time – much lower 
than those witnessed since 2003. More recent model comparison exercises found relatively low 
global mitigation costs for a range of long-term climate change mitigation targets and 
assumptions of technology availability (Van Vuuren et al. 2009; Clarke et al. 2009; Edenhofer et 
al. 2010; Luderer et al. 2012a); few studies have focused on the role and uncertainties of fossil 
energy markets (Perrson et al. 2007; IEA 2009; Rosenberg et al. 2010; Lüken et al. 2011; Nemet 
and Brandt 2011). These confirm that the distributional effects for oil- and gas-rich countries are 
quite small (some even positive), but the analyses did not include a full account of fossil energy 
markets; e.g. Perrson et al. (2007) note the weakness of the model used to predict oil prices being 
much lower than the 60US$/bbl of that time.  
In the energy economics literature, resource abundance and the future of energy markets are 
highly disputed. The “optimistic” perspective is usually captured by a cumulative supply cost 
function that assumes higher prices will make more deposits competitive (Aguilera et al. 2009). 
This concept implicitly assumes the theorem of Herfindahl (1967): deposits are fully exhausted 
in the sequence of their increasing marginal costs, and marginal costs always equal average 
costs. “Pessimists” following the Hubbert-approach assume that a given amount of fossil fuels 
from a single deposit is available and a set of shape parameters, like the production decline rate, 
determines the future depletion path, but prices have only limited influence (Sorrell et al. 2010). 
“Optimists” and “pessimists” disagree strongly on the interrelationship between prices and the 
changes in production. 
Jakobsson et al. (2012) attempt a synthesis. They argue that the cumulative supply cost 
function is not sufficient for determining fossil fuel prices. Inertia, imposed by flow rate 
constraints that limit the decline of extraction from each deposit, leads to the simultaneous 
exhaustion of various deposits. Static price formation drives the market price above the highest 
marginal costs of all open deposits, which in turn exceeds total average costs and implies 
producer rents.  
Regional differentiation of fossil resource endowments and transportation costs also require 
careful consideration in the price formation mechanism. The home-bias effect (Obstfeld and 
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Rogoff 2000), leads to regional price differences and diversity of energy use across regions. The 
global energy system’s development as well as mitigation potentials strongly depend on regional 
diversification. 
For the present study the representation of fossil extraction in the global energy-economy-
climate model REMIND was extended by the supply dynamics and home-bias effect. The 
sensitivities of baseline assumptions are tested to produce a novel set of baseline and climate 
change stabilization scenarios. The modeling approach comprises fundamental economic, 
technical and geological factors of fossil energy supply. When presenting results we will also 
briefly discuss other related factors such as volatility and current high prices, although these are 
not the major focus of the present paper. 
We address three research questions. What is the global long-term development of fossil fuel 
markets under different baseline assumptions and what is the impact of climate change 
mitigation policies? How large are the fossil resource rents and how do they depend on baseline 
assumptions and climate policies? How does the change in fossil rents compare with the 
revenues from carbon pricing? 
Section 2 introduces the methodology regarding the general modeling framework and the 
modeling approach of the fossil fuel markets in particular. Section 3 gives an overview of the 
design of the scenarios, reports the results and puts them into perspective with the literature. 
Section 4 draws conclusions and provides an outlook on further research. 
2. Methodology 
This section provides (i) a general overview of the REMIND model and (ii) a more detailed 
treatment of the fossil fuel extraction sector. The Supporting Online Material of the Synthesis 
Paper (Kriegler et al., this issue) provides more details. The current version of REMIND builds 
on previous model versions (Bauer et al. 2012a, b; Luderer et al. 2012b). 
REMIND is a global multi-regional model of the economy, energy sector and the climate 
system that computes long-term general equilibrium pathways until 2100. In each region a 
detailed bottom-up energy sector model is embedded in a Ramsey-type optimal growth model 
with a top-down production and a social welfare function. The hard-link between the two sectors 
and the inter-temporal structure guarantees simultaneous equilibrium on all markets for energy, 
capital, goods and labor, with perfect foresight (Bauer et al. 2008). The energy sector demands 
primary energy carriers (including fossil fuels, nuclear, renewables, etc.) that are converted into 
final energy carriers; these are then supplied to the macro-economic sector, which in turn uses 
them in combination with capital and labor to generate GDP. GDP is allocated to investments, 
energy expenditures and household consumption. Households maximize intertemporal welfare as 
the sum of discounted utilities of private consumption using a pure rate of time preference of 
3%/yr. Hence, the trade-off between current and future consumption is balanced by choosing 
investments and the use of resources including fossil fuels. Trade in goods, fossil energy, 
uranium and emission permits between regions is modeled. The Negishi approach computes 
market equilibria for these goods subject to constraints on the inter-temporal balance of 
payments of each region and import-export constraints for the world market in each period. The 
capital accounts are balanced, since net foreign assets across regions always sum up to zero.  
The energy sector in each region represents capacity stocks for the conversion of energy 
carriers. Investments expand the capacity stocks, but compete with household consumption. 
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Several non-linearities are considered including endogenous technological learning, adjustment 
costs of ramping up specific capacities, and grid and storage penalties for wind and solar 
electricity generation.  
GHG and aerosol emissions from the energy sector are joint products of energy production 
and conversion processes. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies can reduce emissions 
from fossil fuel use and even remove carbon from the atmosphere if combined with bio-energy. 
GHG emissions not originating from the energy sector are subject to exogenous baseline 
emissions. Non-CO2 GHG emissions from the energy sector add to these baselines. Marginal 
abatement cost curves (MACC) represent the emission reduction potentials. Aerosol emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion are endogenously linked to activity levels with exogenous 
assumptions about pollution controls leading to, e.g. desulphurization.  
Fossil fuel extraction sectors utilize coal, oil and gas endowments in each region. 
Endowments are subdivided into different cost grades. In addition to the long-term supply 
functions (Fig. S1) additional features characterize the fossil extraction sector in REMIND. The 
supply flow from each grade can grow no more than 10% annually and generally not decline 
more than 15%/yr. However, low cost grades of oil and gas exhibit smaller decline rates as 
reported in Table S1 (IEA 2008, 2009). The smallest decline rate of 3.4%/yr is assumed for the 
lowest cost grade of oil in the Middle East and North Africa (MEA) region. Higher cost grades, 
for instance unconventional oil and gas, show higher decline rates, since extraction requires 
stimulation techniques.  
In addition to these hard constraints, changes of supply flows from each grade lead to 
adjustment costs that are quadratic in the annual rate of output change. These short-term annual 
supply curves are combined with the long-term cumulative supply functions. Large relative 
changes in annual output lead to large relative mark-ups over the long-term extraction costs.  For 
a change of annual output of 5% , the mark-up is also 5%, i.e. the elasticity equals one. Below 
(above) this value the elasticity is less (higher) than one due to the quadratic form. We have 
chosen relatively optimistic values (Dahl and Duggan 1998; Krichene 2002; Askari and Krichene 
2010) for two reasons. First, REMIND operates at five year time steps, but supply responses are 
usually estimated for shorter periods. Second, estimates of supply elasticities post-2000 were 
found smaller, even negative, compared to pre-2000 elasticities (Askari and Krichene 2010). We 
note that the empirical literature on the inertia of fossil fuel supply is limited, though the ramp-up 
of new technologies is crucial.  
 The extraction of fossil fuels is accompanied by GHG emissions. Methane emissions 
intensities of gas and coal extraction can be reduced from historical values s according to a 
MACC. For non-conventional oil the carbon intensity increases with decreasing fuel quality and 
lower energy return on energy invested (Brandt 2009; Charpentier et al. 2009).  
Transport costs of fossil fuel trade are differentiated for exports and imports. Exporters incur 
costs for transporting the goods to the border or a harbor, where the fuel enters the global market 
and exporters receive the world market price. Importers pay the costs for inter-regional 
transportation and carry the burden of losses for transportation including liquefaction of natural 
gas. Table S2 summarizes the trading cost parameters. The import distances of each region are 
measured by taking into account the distances of exporting countries to the import points (like 
main harbors) of the importing regions.  
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3. Results 
The results of the various scenarios are presented in three steps. The Default Baseline scenario 
without mitigation is discussed first. Section 3.2 analyzes the sensitivity of baseline assumptions 
without climate policies. Third, the impact of climate policies is analyzed assuming a 550ppm 
CO2-eq “not-to-exceed” target (called 550-e) and a 450ppm CO2-eq target with overshoot before 
2100 (450-e), with both policies being analyzed for different baseline assumptions. The 
temporary overshoot is allowed in the stronger 450-e scenario because otherwise the long-term 
target is not feasible. See Table S3 for an overview of scenarios.  
 
Fig. 1: Historical development (1990-2005) of primary energy consumption in direct equivalents and the 
default baseline (2005-2100). Historical data is taken from IEA (2007). 
3.1	The	Default	Baseline	
The Default Baseline scenario applies the reference case assumptions (intermediate levels of 
population, economic growth and fossil fuel availability) and does not impose limitations on 
atmospheric GHG concentrations. Two general features characterize the development of the 
energy sector.  
First, total annual demand for final energy carriers grows over the 21st century from 365EJ in 
2010 to 890EJ in 2100 (see Fig. S3&4). This growth comes along with modernizing energy use 
by decreasing the share of solid fuels and non-transportation liquids and increasing the share of 
gases, transportation fuels and electricity. Second, developing countries’ share of final energy 
demand increases due to the assumed convergence of per-capita incomes.  
Second, global annual primary energy production shown in Fig. 1 grows from 515EJ in 2010 
to 1260EJ in 2100. Fossil fuels play the dominant role until mid-century; thereafter the share of 
non-fossil fuels increases to supply electricity. Coal is partially reallocated from the electricity 
sector to the production of synthetic liquids for the transportation sector to substitute for crude 
oil after its peak. Gas and coal use show strong variations between regions due to transportation 
costs and relative abundance of domestic primary energy supplies.  
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The overall growth and stabilization in fossil fuel use is driven by structural changes between 
oil, coal, and gas. The total output of oil grows steadily until 2060, peaking at 280EJ p.a. Coal 
output grows rapidly, at an average rate of 2.2% p.a. from 2010 until 2030. Average annual 
growth slows to 0.8% over the rest of the century as non-fossils gain share in the electricity 
sector and coal use is shifted towards the supply of liquid transportation fuels. Natural gas output 
grows at 3.7%/yr as it is increasingly used in the electricity sector until 2030. Afterwards gas 
output growth slows and production peaks at 325EJ in 2060. The cumulative consumption of 
coal, oil and gas from 2010 to 2100 is 26ZJ, 23.2ZJ and 25.5ZJ, respectively, leading to total 
carbon emissions of 5780 GtCO2 (see also Fig. S5). 
 
Fig. 2 Historical development (1980–2011) and future fossil fuel prices (2010–2100) in the Default 
baseline. The regional prices are indicated by the individual solid lines; areas show the variations. Solid 
thick lines are global average prices. Historical prices (BP 2012) for coal and gas for different regions are 
only shown for few import countries (US, Europe and Japan). Since the scenarios cover all regions, the 
spread in future prices is larger 
The corresponding scenarios of fossil fuel prices are shown in Fig. 2. The graph also 
illustrates the huge volatility of fossil fuel prices observed in the recent past. As the price effect 
of the 1970s oil shocks disappeared in the early eighties the world experienced a phase of 
relatively stable prices with growing output until 2003. From 2003 until 2008 prices escalated. 
After a dip due to the recession in 2009 they increased again.  
The future global average oil price starts at 8.1US$/GJ in 2015 (in today’s prices 
55US$/barrel) and increases to 11.3US$/GJ by 2030 because of a transition towards higher cost 
oil deposits as cheap oil deposits are limited and decline (see Fig. S6). During this transition 
phase prices significantly exceed average extraction costs (see Fig. S7). After 2030 oil prices 
stagnate around 11US$/GJ and increase strongly close to the peak of oil production. The 
increasing price is not strong enough to avoid peak oil. Despite this marked increase the figures 
are lower than the oil price assumptions by IEA (2011) that range from 14.3 to 20.6US$/GJ until 
2035. Comparing with US EIA (2011) analysis the Baseline scenario lies between the medium 
(18.1US$/GJ) and the low oil price scenario (7.4US$/GJ).  
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The global average gas price starts at 4.3US$/GJ in 2015, ranging between 2.5 and 
5.9US$/GJ, with exporting (importing) regions at the lower (upper) end. Natural gas prices 
escalate less than oil prices because gas reserves are still relatively abundant over the next two 
decades. Import regions are producing also from non-conventional sources like shale gas, since 
trade costs lead to a relatively high domestic price. The price assumptions of IEA (2011) are 
considerably higher for the two gas importing regions Europe and Japan, where gas prices 
increase up to 11.8US$/GJ until 2030 and are nearly twice the US import prices. In the present 
scenario the global average price of natural gas relative to oil starts at 0.52, decreases to 0.48 
around 2030 and stabilized around 0.6 at the end of the century.  
The global average price of coal starts at 1.7US$/GJ in 2015, ranging between .8 and 
2.0US$/GJ. Low cost coal reserves are still plentiful and, thus, supply grows at moderate prices. 
Over the longer term, however, the average coal price reaches 7.1US$/GJ. The price ratio of coal 
to oil starts at 0.21, and increases to nearly 0.3 at the end of the century. In the 1990s the ratio 
was at 0.6 and decreased to 0.3 in the first decade of the 21st century. IEA (2011) assumes a 
nearly constant ratio of 0.2 until 2035. 
There is a growing literature on fossil fuel price increases, with a particular emphasis on oil 
prices. Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009) and Fan and Xu (2011) highlight demand growth. Askari 
and Krichene (2010) highlight the price-unresponsive supply side since 2010. Besides such 
fundamental factors other short-term and transitory issues are considered. Askari and Krichene 
(2010) identify expansionary monetary policy as an important oil demand driver. Kaufman 
(2011) mentions mutually reinforcing interactions between production declines in non-OPEC 
countries and changes in futures markets. Dees et al. (2008) and Fan and Xu (2011) also identify 
speculation as a crucial factor; the former also note bottlenecks in refinery capacities. Market 
power by OPEC is, however, not identified as an important factor (Dees et al. 2008; Hamilton 
2009). REMIND explains energy prices based on market fundamentals and does not consider 
other transitory effects, though they are important price drivers. The integration of such 
transitory effects poses a major research challenge. 
Fig. 3 shows the net present values of resource rents2 differentiated by fuel and region. The 
total fossil resource rent adds up to 29.9tril.US$. The largest rent accrues to oil (18.3tril.US$)  
from which the MENA region receives the largest share (10.4tril.US$). The global gas rent is 
8.2tril.US$ and mainly earned by the MENA region, Russia and the US. The coal rent is the 
smallest (3.5tril.US$) mainly earned by the US and China. Gas and coal rents are distributed 
more evenly across regions than the oil rent due to the geographical distribution of endowments 
and transportation costs. The transportation costs form a barrier protecting domestic producers in 
import regions with relatively high prices. Exporters can only charge rents net of transportation 
costs. The effect is more pronounced for gas and coal than for oil. Hence, oil exporters can profit 
more from the world market price (see Fig. S7).  
                                                 
2 Rents are the discounted stream of annual profits of a region from selling fossil resources. For each region we 
use the domestic price as well as the production costs and the domestic transportation costs. The international 
transportation costs need not be taken into account because they are equivalent to the price differences to the 
international market price. See also Fig. S7&8. 
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Fig. 3 Net present value of fossil fuel rents (2010–2100) in the Default baseline. The discount rate is 5 % 
p.a. ROW indicates ‘Rest of World’ and MENA ‘Middle East, North Africa’ 
3.2	Sensitivity	of	Baseline	Assumptions	
Fig. 4 shows the cumulative changes of fossil fuel consumption during the 21st century use for 
variations of economic growth assumptions and cumulative fossil fuel supply in the baseline 
scenarios (see Fig. S1&2 and also S9-11). Changes in economic growth assumptions increase 
fossil fuel demand by 4.9ZJ in the Fast Growth and decrease it by 5.7ZJ in the Slow Growth 
scenario; CO2 emissions change accordingly. In the High Fossils scenario the consumption of oil 
and gas increase by 8.7ZJ and 7ZJ, respectively, whereas coal consumption decreases by 4.2ZJ.3 
The inter-fuel substitution effect comes from the smaller deployment of coal-to-liquids and 
higher gas use in the electricity sector. In the Low Fossils case all fossil fuels decrease 
significantly by 18.4ZJ and CO2 emissions by 1420Gt.4 In the case of Low Oil the consumption 
of coal and gas increase by 7.9ZJ and 10.4ZJ, respectively, but oil output declines by 8.3ZJ. In 
the High Coal case oil and gas use is reduced by 14ZJ, but the nearly equal increase of coal 
consumption leads to net positive impacts on CO2 emissions. In the High Gas case total CO2 
emissions increase by 300Gt because the boost in natural gas consumption (8.6ZJ) outweighs 
reductions of coal (1.5ZJ) and oil consumption (0.6ZJ). In summary, the fossil fuel use and CO2 
emissions react more sensitive to change in fossil fuel supply than in long-term energy demand.  
                                                 
3 This sensitivity is also observed in the GCAM and the WITCH model. Hence, the result is a property of 
variations in assumptions and not model-specific. 
4 The Weak Policy scenario leads to cumulative emission reductions of only 840GtCO2 mainly due to 6.1ZJ less 
coal consumption.  
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Fig. 4 Differences of global cumulative fossil energy consumption 2010–2100 compared with the Default 
Baseline. The use of coal, oil and gas is 26ZJ, 23.2ZJ and 25.5ZJ, respectively. The unit ZJ is 1021 
Joules. Carbon emissions are 5780GtCO2. The numbers on the right hand part of the graph indicate the 
change in cumulative CO2 emissions. The unit GtCO2 is 109 metric tons of CO2). The case “Low Oil” 
indicates low availability oil and high availability of coal and gas; the case “High Coal” is the same but the 
availability of gas is assumed low; “High Gas” indicates medium availability of oil and coal, but high 
availability of gas; the case “Weak Policy” considers moderate policies explained in more detail in Luderer 
et al. (this issue)  
Fig. 5 shows the sensitivity of global average oil prices. The oil price depends more on 
cumulative fossil fuel supply than on energy demand driven by GDP growth. The difference is 
significant in the near term as changes in fossil supply induce immediate price differences. The 
short-term oil price grows at a higher rate in the Low Fossils case reaching 13.8US$ per GJ in 
2030, whereas it is significantly lower in the High Fossils case. Even in the Low Fossils case the 
oil price is lower than in the IEA (2011) assumptions, and in the High Fossil scenario it would  
be less than half. 
Low-cost natural gas is relatively more abundant than low-cost oil in all cases, and therefore 
the initial natural gas prices are less sensitive to resource assumptions (see Fig. S10). In the 
longer term, fossil fuel supply is more important for natural gas prices than demand growth. The 
ratio of gas to oil prices over time is nearly the same in all baseline scenarios, except for the High 
Fossils case in which the ratio is closer to unity. Near-term coal prices are generally the same 
with one exception: The very pessimistic assumption of low cost coal availability (only 25% of 
coal reserves are assumed) in the Low Fossil case leads to a 60% increase of the global average 
coal price.  
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Fig. 5 Global average oil price for the history (1980–2011) and baseline scenarios (2010–2100). Source 
of historical prices: BP (2012) 
3.3	Implications	of	Mitigation	on	Fossil	Fuel	Use	and	Rents	
The imposition of stabilization targets has strong impacts on the fossil energy sector. Fig. 6 
compares the use of fossil fuels, the net atmospheric CO2 emissions from energy and industry 
and the CO2 removal from the atmosphere through bio-energy combined with CCS in 
stabilization scenarios. There are three noteworthy findings. 
 First, coal use reacts most sensitively to climate change stabilization and is reduced by 55-
85% for the 550-e and 85-90% in the 450-e case. Oil consumption declines much less. The 
variation of fossil fuel use with baseline assumptions is significantly reduced with climate policy. 
The more stringent the stabilization target the smaller is the variation. This is due to the 
constraint on fossil fuel combustion that largely decouples fossil energy use from fossil fuel 
availability and energy demand. The decoupling is strongest for coal and weakest for oil. Fig: 
S13 shows the response of fossil fuel prices to the reduced demand in the climate policy 
scenarios. Near term price reductions are only observed for coal.  
Second, the cumulative consumption of oil exceeds the conventional reserve and resource 
estimates of 11.6ZJ for both climate stabilization targets. For the 550-e case, cumulative 
consumption also exceeds the additional amount of non-conventional oil reserves (3.4ZJ).  In 
contrast, non-conventional oil resources will be used only in the baseline cases without climate 
policy. Natural gas consumption in all baseline and 550-e scenarios exceeds the total 
conventional endowment (16.5ZJ). Coal consumption exceeds reserves in all baseline scenarios, 
but in stabilization scenarios a significant share of the reserve will be left underground. 
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Fig. 6 Cumulative global fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions 2010–2100 for different scenarios. The lower 
right graph includes the cumulative net CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry FF&I (dotted lines) as 
well as the CO2 captured and sequestered from bio-energy BECCS (dashed lines). For the purpose of 
orientation the diamonds on the right hand axis of the bottom-right indicate the cumulative emissions of 
the representative concentration pathways (data from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/tnt/RcpDb). The 
stacked bar plots to the right hand side of the three fossil fuel plots show estimates of fossil fuel 
availabilities (Rogner 1997; BGR 2010; GEA is Rogner et al. 2012); USGS is taken from GEA. Note: the 
extraction sequence suggested by the stacked bars is not necessarily the economically rational 
sequence; some non-conventional reserves can be cheaper than conventional resources 
Finally, cumulative CO2 emissions are approximately 2330GtCO2 in the 550-e cases and 
1260GtCO2 in the 450-e cases. The diamonds on the right hand axis indicate the corresponding 
amounts for the representative concentration pathways (RCPs; Van Vuuren et al., 2011) whose 
climate outcomes have been investigated in the most recent climate model comparison study 
(CMIP5). It can be seen that the baseline variation of emissions spans the range between the two 
high RCPs, while the 450 ppm CO2-eq scenario leads to cumulative emissions on the order of 
RCP2.6. The cumulative amount of bio-energy in combination with CCS is 520-700GtCO2 in the 
550-e cases and 760-900GtCO2 in the 450-e cases. 
Fig. 7 shows that the adoption of the stabilization targets has an unambiguously negative 
impact on global fossil fuel rents that is overcompensated by the newly generated global rent 
from carbon emission allowances. The global fossil fuel rent in the baseline case (29.9tril.US$) 
falls by 8.7tril.US$ for the 550-e target and by 12.4tril.US$ for the 450-e stabilization target. 
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Reduction of the oil rent is largest (3.5tril.US$), closely followed by coal, if the 550-e target is 
imposed; for the 450-e target the reduction of the oil rent is 5.7tril.US$ and natural gas rent loss 
is second with 3.6tril.US$. The carbon rent is 21.2tril.US$ for the 550-e and 31.9tril.US$ for the 
450-e case. Carbon prices are shown in Fig. S12. Regional changes of carbon rents are shown in 
Fig. S14. It shows that regions with high energy demand like China would generate huge carbon 
rents that are much larger than the loss of fossil fuel rent. For other regions including the Middle 
East and North Africa showing the largest loss of fossil fuel rent the carbon rent is still sufficient 
to compensate. However, for a country like Russia the compensation is not feasible based on the 
domestically generated carbon rent. In summary, the loss of fossil fuel rent could be 
compensated by the carbon rent at the global level, but this does not hold for necessarily hold for 
all countries.  
 
Fig. 7 Net present value NPV (2010–2100) of global fossil fuel rents and the global carbon permit rent. 
On the right hand side of the graph we present the NPVof GDP in trillion US$05 and the changes from 
climate change stabilization policies. The discount rate is 5 % 
Fig. 7 puts the climate policy impacts on fossil fuel and carbon rent and net present value 
GDP into perspective.  GDP losses are no longer available to society, with part of the loss borne 
by fossil fuel owners due to decreased sales (see Fig. S13). In contrast, fossil fuel rent loss 
associated with lower prices for the residual fossil fuel use is transformed into the carbon rent, 
which can in turn be redistributed. 
The fossil fuel rent increases with energy demand expected pattern, since higher demand 
increases  fossil fuel use and the price  (32.4tril.US$ in the high growth scenario and vice 
versa28.1trilUS$ in the slow growth case). The carbon rent also scales with total demand, and 
overcompensates the losses in fossil fuel rent also under slow and fast GDP growth. The 
sensitivity with respect to variations of fossil supply combines price and quantity effects that 
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work in opposite directions. In this study the price effect is stronger and, thus, the fossil fuel rent 
is smaller in the High Fossils case (23.8trilUS$) and higher in the Low Fossils case 
(38.1tril.US$). The reason is that fossil fuels are limited and difficult to substitute and, hence, the 
implicit demand curves are price-inelastic. Supply side variations have a larger impact on fossil 
fuel rents than demand side variations. This continues to hold under climate policy conditions.  
4. Conclusion  
Policies aiming at climate change stabilization will strongly affect fossil fuel markets. The 
energy market response to climate policy intervention shows several features that are robust to 
changes in energy demand and fossil fuel supply. The reduction of coal consumption is strongest, 
and a large part of the reserve would remain unused in the 450-e and 550-e stabilization cases. 
However, since coal is plentiful and relatively easy to substitute, the coal rent is already small in 
the absence of climate policy, and therefore its reduction due to climate policy limited. Oil and 
gas consumption is much less reduced by climate policy. Cumulative oil consumption under 
strong climate change mitigation is comparable with the amount of conventional oil resources 
and partly non-conventional oil reserves. Also cumulative gas use exceeds the conventional gas 
reserve. Despite the continued use of oil in the climate policy scenarios, the loss of oil rents is the 
largest among the fossil fuels because oil is scarce and difficult to substitute, and climate policy 
prevents the transition to high cost deposits.  Thus, the reduction of the oil rent is mainly due to a 
decrease in oil prices. The price effect on the oil and gas rent adds to the finding of Grubb 
(2001), who focused only on the quantity effect.  
A key finding of our analysis is that the loss in fossil fuel rents is over-compensated by the 
carbon rent introduced by climate stabilization targets (see Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013). It accrues 
to the owner of the emissions allowances, and therefore opens the possibility to compensate 
those that lose from climate policy. We also show that this is not necessarily the case at the 
country level based on the domestically generated carbon rent. Assuming that the efficiency of 
markets is not affected by the initial allocation of freely tradable emission permit among regions, 
admittedly a strong assumption, the results demonstrate  the availability of permit allocations 
schemes that would compensate fossil fuel rent losses of all regions. The essential point is that 
the fossil fuel rent depends on natural endowments whereas its reduction as well as the 
compensation depends on international climate policies. The carbon rent, however, cannot only 
be seen as a compensatory fund for the loss of fossil fuel rents because higher final energy prices 
will also lead to economy-wide losses of GDP. Moreover, the large values of rents and their 
redistribution must also be treated with care. The rents are subject to various uncertainties and 
the compensation of their losses with the climate rent discussed here does not suggest that such 
compensation mechanism is required. The general findings on rent redistribution are robust 
against variations in energy demand and fossil supply assumptions. For future fossil fuel use and 
rents, assumptions about fossil fuel supply are more important than the assumptions about future 
energy demand.  
For improved understanding of the interaction of fossil fuels markets and climate policies a 
number of improvements are desirable. The role of bio-energy with CCS as well as afforestation 
must be analyzed in more detail, because the capability to produce negative emissions can allow 
prolonged use of fossil fuels (see Nemet and Brandt 2011). Moreover, the current high fossil 
energy prices are the subject of heated debates. It is crucial to understand the reasons (including 
structural under-investment in the extraction sector, strategic behavior, etc.) for the high prices 
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and whether these prices are only transitory or permanent. In case of permanence we need to 
understand whether this is due to techno-economic costs or geological scarcity or other reasons. 
If these prices are only transitory it is important to understand the role of dynamic factors of 
expanding supply and whether climate policies (or efficiency measures) would have a drastic 
impact on the prices by reducing demand. Finally, climate policies also affect assets (uranium, 
land, etc.) other than fossil fuels. Hence, a more comprehensive analysis of distributional 
consequences of climate policies is a promising field of future research.  
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